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ExEcutivE summary
•	 Since	 the	 2003	 ‘Rose	Revolution’,	Georgia	has	been	 the	most	
spectacular	example	of	a	successful	export	of	the	Western	po-
litical	and	economic	model	to	a	post-Soviet	country	other	than	
the	Baltic	States;	an	example	of	a	country	 that	has	managed	
to	develop	strong	relations	with	the	West,	as	well	as	efficient	
and	modern	state	structures	which	did	not	collapse	under	the	
burden	of	the	lost	war	with	Russia.
•	 The	strength	of	the	Georgian	state	lies	in	its	young,	pro-West-
ern	and	determined	elite	which,	thanks	to	the	substantial	aid	
provided	by	the	USA	and	the	EU,	has	managed	to	reform	the	
state	thoroughly	within	a	short	timeframe.	At	the	same	time,	
however,	the	merging	of	the	political	elite	with	the	state,	and	
the	personalisation	of	state	institutions,	have	created	a	series	
of	problems,	undermining	democracy,	weakening	state	insti-
tutions	and	widening	 the	distance	between	Georgia	and	 the	
West.	 Today,	 Georgia’s	 weaknesses	 mainly	 manifest	 them-
selves	through	the	defects	of	 its	democracy.	However,	 in	the	
future	they	could	also	undermine	the	country’s	relations	with	
the	West,	its	stability,	and	the	social	and	economic	bases	of	the	
Georgian	state.
•	 Georgia	will	hold	parliamentary	elections	in	October	of	2012	
and	presidential	elections	in	2013.	These	two	votes	will	come	
as	a	multidimensional	test	for	the	state	that	was	built	over	the	
last	decade,	especially	its	stability,	the	condition	of	the	ruling	
elite	and	its	ability	to	reconcile	the	paradigms	of	a	strong	state	
and	democracy,	as	well	as	the	political	maturity	of	the	Geor-
gian	public.
•	 Reforming	the	current	economic	model	will	be	an	additional	
challenge	in	the	coming	years.	After	the	‘Rose	Revolution’,	the	
Georgian	economy	underwent	thorough	reforms	aimed	at	lib-
eralisation	and	deregulation,	thanks	to	which	Georgia	gained	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
12
6
dynamic	 economic	 growth	 and	 international	 recognition	 as	
one	of	the	word’s	top	economic	reformers.	However,	structural	
economic	and	social	problems	such	as	poverty,	unemployment	
and	the	breakdown	of	agriculture	remained	unsolved.	In	ad-
dition,	Georgia	is	heavily	dependent	on	foreign	assistance.	It	
will	be	a	daunting	task	for	the	ruling	elite	to	develop	an	eco-
nomic	model	that	will	allow	sustainable	development	without	
relying	on	foreign	aid.
•	 Georgia	 is	 facing	 its	 political	 and	 economic	 challenges	 in	
a	complicated	international	situation:	it	has	to	maintain	close	
relations	with	the	EU	and	the	USA,	and	is	also	facing	threats	
from	an	unstable	regional	environment	and	Russia’s	policy,	as	
well	as	the	global	economic	crisis.	Nevertheless,	the	outcomes	
of	its	internal	processes,	including	the	dilemmas	related	to	the	
upcoming	electoral	 tests,	 depend	primarily	on	 the	Georgian	
ruling	elite	and	public.
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introduction
With	the	rise	to	power	of	President	Mikheil	Saakashvili	and	his	
circle	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2003	‘Rose	Revolution’1	Georgia	en-
tered	 a	 path	 of	 dynamic	 reforms	which	were	unprecedented	 in	
the	CIS;	these	were	aimed	in	the	internal	dimension	at	creating	an	
efficient	and	modern	state,	and	in	the	external	dimension	at	an-
choring	the	country	in	European	and	Euro-Atlantic	political	and	
security	structures,	with	a	view	to	permanently	breaking	away	
from	the	Russian	sphere	of	influence.
The	wide	range	of	successful	internal	and	foreign	policy	develop-
ments	which	culminated	in	the	promise	of		a	future	NATO	mem-
bership	 extended	 to	 Georgia	 at	 the	 Bucharest	 summit	 in	 April	
2008	was	first	undermined	by	the	internal	political	crisis	in	the	
autumn	of	 2007	 (the	 suppression	of	mass	anti-government	pro-
tests),	which	adversely	affected	Georgia’s	image	as	the	‘beacon	of	
liberty’	among	the	post-Soviet	states;	and	even	more	importantly,	
by	the	war	with	Russia	in	August	2008.	
The	war	opened	a	new	chapter	in	Georgia’s	recent	history.	Mos-
cow’s	recognition	of	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia’s	independence	
and	the	deployment	of	significant	military	forces	in	their	territo-
ries,	combined	with	the	development	of	military	infrastructures	
in	the	area,	has	indefinitely	postponed	the	prospect	of	Georgia	re-
storing	its	territorial	integrity.	
In	the	international	dimension,	the	war	demonstrated	to	the	West	
that	Russia	was	determined	to	defend	its	interests	in	the	CIS	area.	
1	 The	mass	public	protests	against	the	rigged	parliamentary	election	of	2	No-
vember	2003,	and	more	broadly	against	the	corruption	and	inefficiency	of	
the	state	and	Georgia’s	economic	breakdown,	which	 led	President	Eduard	
Shevardnadze	to	step	down	on	23	November	2003.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	
‘Rose	Revolution’,	a	broad,	pro-Western	coalition	of	opposition	forces	took	
over	 power,	 led	 by	 Mikheil	 Saakashvili,	 Zurab	 Zhvania	 and	 Nino	 Bur-
janadze.	On	 4	 January	 2004,	Mikheil	 Saakashvili	was	 elected	 as	 the	new	
president	of	Georgia,	winning	96%	of	the	votes.
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It	also	undermined	the	credibility	of	Georgia’s	political	leadership	
which	–	in	the	more	forgiving	variant	–	was	accused	of	an	impru-
dence	that	allowed	Georgia	to	be	drawn	into	a	Russian	provoca-
tion,	and	–	in	the	less	friendly	variant	–	was	deemed	responsible	
for	the	outbreak	of	the	armed	conflict.	These	two	factors	clearly	
diminished	the	Western	states’	appetite2	 for	significant	political	
and	military	involvement	in	Georgia,	isolated	Tbilisi	internation-
ally	and,	apparently,	undid	Georgia’s	chances	of	joining	NATO	for	
many	years	to	come.	The	war	also	triggered	a	dramatic	decline	in	
foreign	investments	which,	combined	with	the	onset	of	the	global	
crisis,	hit	 the	Georgian	economy	painfully,	and	 its	performance	
has	still	not	returned	to	pre-war	 levels.	At	 the	same	time,	how-
ever,	the	conflict	with	Russia	demonstrated	the	resilience	of	the	
young	state,	which	did	not	collapse	in	the	face	of	military	defeat,	
and	the	strong	position	of	Mikheil	Saakashvili	himself,	who	held	
on	to	office	and	even	reinforced	his	popularity,	contrary	to	the	ex-
pectations	which	Russia	had	openly	expressed.	
In	the	 light	of	 the	crisis	of	Georgia’s	big	political	projects	 (to	re-
store	the	country’s	territorial	integrity	and	integrate	with	NATO,	
which	had	been	guiding	the	leadership’s	internal	and	foreign	pol-
icy),	and	due	to	the	relatively	low	likelihood	of	a	new	conflict	with	
Russia3,	the	need	for	a	new	wave	of	internal	reforms	has	become	
2	 This	change	in	attitude	towards	Georgia	was	the	most	evident	in	the	case	of	
the	patron	of	Georgia’s	reforms,	the	United	States.	Between	2004	and	2008,	
President	George	W.	Bush	had	met	President	Mikheil	Saakashvili	five	times:	
the	US	president	visited	Tbilisi	on	one	occasion	(May	2005),	and	the	Geor-
gian	president	met	the	US	leader	at	the	White	House	three	times.	In	the	pe-
riod	2009–2012,	after	the	war	and	the	change	of	administration	in	the	USA,	
President	Barack	Obama	met	Saakashvili	three	times,	but	only	one	of	those	
meetings,	on	31	January	2012,	was	an	official	visit	by	the	Georgian	president	
to	the	White	House	(the	remaining	two	encounters	were	behind-the-scenes	
meetings	on	the	occasion	of	 the	NATO	summit	 in	Lisbon	in	October	2010,	
and	the	funeral	of	Richard	Holbrooke	in	Washington	in	January	2011).
3	 The	likelihood	of	a	new	war	seems	low	because	of	such	factors	as	the	pres-
ence	of	the	EUMM	monitoring	mission	in	the	conflict	regions,	Tbilisi’s	cau-
tious	policy	towards	the	separatist	regions,	and	the	coming	winter	Olym-
pics	in	Sochi	in	2014.	However,	it	is	difficult	to	estimate	how	the	situation	
concerning	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia	will	be	influenced	by	the	dynamics	
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evident.	This	concerns	reforms	in	areas	which	have	hitherto	re-
ceived	little	attention	(from	both	the	government	and	large	sec-
tions	of	the	public)	inter alia	because	of	the	sheer	scale	of	the	chal-
lenges	related	to	the	primary	objective	of	ensuring	state	security	
and	 thoroughly	 rebuilding	 the	 state	 institutions,	 the	 neglect	 of	
which	has	for	many	years	exposed	the	Saakashvili	camp	to	criti-
cism.	In	particular,	those	areas	include	democratising	the	political	
system	to	ensure	that	all	political	groups	will	vie	for	voter	support	
on	a	level	playing	field;	that	the	state	is	founded	on	the	rule	of	law,	
its	institutions	are	apolitical,	and	its	public	life	(including	that	of	
the	 business	 and	media)	 transparent.	 The	 social	 and	 economic	
situation	also	calls	for	decisive	reforms.	Despite	its	good	macro-
economic	performance	since	the	‘Rose	Revolution’,	Georgia’s	econ-
omy	has	lagged	behind	on	modernisation4:	it	is	characterised	by	
an	archaic	employment	structure,	high	unemployment,	an	inef-
ficient	agricultural	sector	(which	in	the	Soviet	period	used	to	be	
a	leading	sector	of	the	economy),	a	heavy	dependence	on	imports	
and,	most	importantly,	foreign	aid	and	investments.	
In	this	situation,	the	upcoming	elections,	to	parliament	in	October	
2012	(the	first	general	elections	since	the	war)	and	the	presidency	
in	2013,	and	the	questions	about	the	future	of	President	Saakash-
vili,	 the	politician	who	has	 in	 fact	built	 the	new	Georgia	and	 is	
personally	responsible	for	both	its	successes	and	its	failures	and	
shortcomings,	will	 be	 crucial	 to	 the	 country’s	 future.	 The	 elec-
tions	will	be	a	multidimensional	test	of	the	stability	and	maturity	
of	the	Georgian	state	and	political	system,	in	which	the	govern-
ment’s	real	commitment	to	democratic	ideals,	public	support	for	
Georgia’s	current	political	course,	the	efficiency	and	impartiality	
of	the	internal	situation	in	Russia.	Also	unknown	are	the	potential	conse-
quences	of	possible	violent	events	in	Georgia’s	international	environment,	
such	 as	 the	 possible	 worsening	 of	 the	 Iran	 situation	 or	 a	 rise	 in	 Azeri-
Armenia	tensions	over	Nagorno-Karabakh.
4	 Georgia’s	main	export	commodities	include	ferric	alloys	(16.7%),	re-exported	
cars	(14.4%)	and	scrap	metal	(6.9%).	Cf.	Georgian	National	Study,	April	26	–	
May	4,	2011.
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of	state	institutions	and	mechanisms,	the	opposition’s	readiness	
to	participate	in	democratic	processes,	and	the	political	maturity	
of	the	elite	and	the	public,	will	all	be	put	to	the	test.	
This	paper,	which	appears	in	the	run-up	to	all	those	choices,	aims	
to	 map	 out	 the	 political	 and	 social	 reality	 in	 Georgia	 today,	 as	
well	as	possible	scenarios	for	future	developments.	It	deliberately	
leaves	out,	or	merely	sketches,	external	factors	–	although	these	
are	undoubtedly	crucial	to	the	country’s	future	–	such	as	relations	
with	Russia,	the	USA	and	the	EU,	regional	stability,	the	global	eco-
nomic	situation,	et al.	
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i. GEorGia aftEr thE ‘rosE rEvolution’
In	early	2004,	 the	camp	of	 the	 ‘Rose	Revolution’	 took	over	what	
was	 effectively	 a	 failed	 state:	 riddled	 with	 corruption,	 unable	
to	perform	its	basic	functions,	and	having	no	control	over	some	
parts	of	 its	 territory	 (Abkhazia,	South	Ossetia)	or	only	nominal	
control	of	others	(Adjara,	Javakhetia).		The	Georgian	people’s	atti-
tude	towards	their	state	during	the	rule	of	Eduard	Shevardnadze	
was	characterised	by	distrust	and	indifference.
The	‘Rose	Revolution’	awakened	their	hopes	for	a	radical	improve-
ment	of	the	situation.	This	translated	into	unprecedented	popu-
lar	support	 for	 the	revolutionary	camp	and	especially	 its	 leader	
Mikheil	Saakashvili,	who	won	more	than	96%	of	the	votes	in	the	
presidential	 election	 in	 January	 2004.	 This	 strong	 democratic	
mandate	and	the	extensive	strengthening	of	presidential	powers	
under	the	constitution	gave	Saakashvili	and	his	aides	de facto	free	
rein	to	implement	reforms.	Radical	change	was	made	possible	by	
support	from	the	West,	especially	the	United	States,	which	became	
not	only	the	political	patron	of	Georgia’s	transformation,	but	also	
the	main	source	of	the	new	leadership’s	inspiration	in	defining	the	
directions	and	content	of	their	reforms.	Both	the	USA	and	the	EU	
provided	the	new	Georgian	leadership	not	only	with	strong	politi-
cal	backing	 (intensified	dialogue	with	NATO,	 including	Georgia	
in	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy),	but	also	considerable	ma-
terial	assistance	(multi-million	grants	and	low-interest	loans)5,	as	
well	as	consultancy	and	training	(including	a	thorough	reform	of	
the	army	under	the	patronage	of	the	United	States).
5	 In	 the	period	 2004–2009,	Georgia	 received	 around	US$3.137	 billion	 in	Of-
ficial	Development	Assistance	(World	Bank	data).	These	figures	do	not	in-
clude	all	categories	of	assistance,	and	they	exclude	a	large	proportion	of	the	
post-war	assistance	package	worth	US$4.5	billion.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
12
12
1. State building
Building	a	modern,	sovereign	state	was	the	top	priority	for	the	new	
leadership,	 a	 task	which	 took	up	most	 of	 the	new	 rulers’	 energy	
and	material	resources.	To	this	end,	a	thorough	reorganisation	of	
the	entire	state	apparatus	at	central	and	local	levels	was	launched.	
Characteristically,	the	changes	were	focused	on	the	consolidation	
of	the	state	and	issues	of	security	and	public	order,	which	manifest-
ed	itself	in	the	two	key	reforms:	the	Interior	Ministry	and	the	army.
Despite	 the	 considerable	 social	 costs,	 stemming	mainly	 from	 job	
cuts	and	reshuffles	in	the	public	sector,	the	reforms	were	successful	
in	many	respects.	The	most	frequently	cited	achievements	of	 the	
Saakashvili	camp	include	restoring	control	over	Adjara,	ensuring	
public	order,	almost	completely	eliminating	corruption	from	eve-
ryday	life6,	upgrading	the	infrastructure,	ensuring	electricity	and	
gas	supplies,	and	punctual	payments	of	salaries	and	benefits.	
The	 state	apparatus	of	Eduard	Shevardnadze’s	Georgia,	 and	 the	
state	institutions	built	by	the	new	leadership	over	just	a	couple	of	
years	with	considerable	training	and	material	assistance	from	the	
West,	were	worlds	apart	in	terms	of	effectiveness,	transparency,	
the	competence	of	civil	servants,	and	the	material	and	technical	
base.	The	quality	of	 services	 for	 the	people	 also	 increased	 radi-
cally	as	corruption	was	eliminated,	red	tape	cut	and	the	state	of-
fices	computerised.
The	reforms	boosted	 the	people’s	 respect	 for	 the	state	and	 their	
confidence	 in	 its	 institutions.	The	police	 and	 the	 army	are	 cur-
rently	the	most	trusted	institutions	in	Georgia	after	the	Georgian	
Orthodox	Church7.	The	state	is	also	an	attractive	employer,	whose	
6	 Georgia	moved	up	the	Transparency	International	ranking	from	133rd	place	
(2004)	to	64th	(2011),	ahead	of	such	EU	member	states	as	Slovakia	(66th),	Italy	
(69th),	Romania	(75th),	Greece	(80th)	and	Bulgaria	(86th).
7	 Cf.	Georgian	National	Study,	April	26	–	May	4,	2011,	 International	Republi-
can	Institute,	Baltic	Surveys	Ltd.	/	The	Gallup	Organization	The	Institute	of	
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appeal	rests	not	only	on	good	salaries	and	the	prospects	for	train-
ing	 abroad	and	quick	promotions	 (at	 44,	 the	president	 is	 one	of	
the	oldest	state	officials),	but	also	the	prestige	of	the	civil	service	
and	the	strong	ethos	of	a	group	of	people	who	are	building	modern	
Georgian	statehood	from	scratch.	In	this	way,	public	administra-
tion	manages	to	attract	a	large	proportion	of	the	best	educated	and	
most	dynamic	professionals	in	Georgia.
2. Economic reforms
The	 centralisation	of	power	 and	 consolidation	of	 the	 state	 after	
2003	coincided	with	opposite	progress	in	certain	spheres:	a	ten-
dency	towards	liberalisation,	deregulation	and	even	the	complete	
withdrawal	of	 the	 state	 from	certain	domains.	The	new	 leader-
ship	adopted	a	strictly	liberal	economic	policy	aimed	at	creating	
an	economic	climate	that	would	be	as	investment-friendly	as	pos-
sible8,	 and	avoiding	practices	 that	 could	 ‘distort	market	mecha-
nisms’9.	 In	practice,	 this	meant	 that	 the	state’s	 role	 in	 the	econ-
omy	was	reduced	considerably,	 red	 tape	was	cut,	all	 taxes	were	
lowered	 and	 simplified,	 custom	 duties	 were	 almost	 completely	
abolished,	most	supervisory	and	regulatory	bodies	were	disman-
tled,	and	the	labour	law	was	radically	liberalised10.	The	Georgian	
Polling	And	Marketing,	p.	54.	http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2011%20
June%2028%20Survey%20of%20Georgian%20Public%20Opinion,%20
April%2026-May%204,%202011%281%29.pdf	(last	accessed	14.11.2011).
8	 In	 the	World	Bank’s	Doing	Business	report,	Georgia	ranked	12th	 in	2011	 in	
terms	of	ease	of	doing	business	 (up	 from	112th	 in	2005).	 In	 the	same	rank-
ing,	Poland	was	70th	and	Russia	123rd.	Cf.	http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/
media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/
DB11-FullReport.pdf	(last	accessed	16	November	2011).
9	 For	example,	the	policy	statement	by	PM	Lado	Gurgenidze	of	October	2008	
on	the	Georgian	economic	model	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-BM-
SjuRckqw	(last	accessed	16	November	2011).
10	 The	 International	 Labour	 Organisation	 (ILO)	 has	 criticised	 the	 Georgian	
labour	laws	for	years.	In	its	2010	report,	the	ILO	expressed	concern	about	
Georgia’s	failure	to	implement	conventions	on	the	right	to	organise	and	the	
right	to	collective	bargaining,	among	other	provisions.
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leadership	also	stopped	pursuing	any	sectoral	economic	policies.	
The	state	also	withdrew	from	the	welfare	sphere,	and	undertook	
a	large-scale	privatisation	of	state	property.
Table 1.	Georgia’s	macroeconomic	indexes	in	2003	–	2010
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
GDP	(US$	billion) 3.99 5.12 6.41 7.74 10.17 12.79 10.76 11.67
GDP	per capita 
PPP		
(US$	thousand)
2.9 3.2 3.6 4 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.1
GDP	growth	rate 11.1%	 5.9% 9.6% 9.4% 12.3% 2.3% -3.8% 6.4%
Foreign	direct	
investments	
(US$billion)
0.33 0.49 0.45 1.17
1.75
(Geo-
stat:
2.01)
1.56 0.65 0.81
Tax	revenue	
(GEL	billion)
1 1.53 1.98 2.64 3.67 4.72 4.39 4.87
Unemployment - 12.5% 13.8% 13.6% 13.3% 16.5% 16.9% 16.3%
source:	WB,	IMF,	Geostat
Thanks	 to	 this	 policy,	 combined	with	 an	 effective	 fight	 against	
corruption	and	the	grey	economy,	Georgia	experienced	dynamic	
economic	 growth,	 very	 good	 macroeconomic	 performance	 and	
recognition	 abroad	 for	 several	 years	 after	 the	 revolution.	 The	
GDP	 and	 foreign	 direct	 investments	 were	 growing	 rapidly	 (see	
Table).	However,	the	war	with	Russia	and	the	financial	crisis	hit	
the	Georgian	economy	badly:	 foreign	 investments	dropped	dra-
matically,	the	economy	contracted	by	nearly	4%	in	2009,	and	un-
employment	 increased.	A	post-war	package	of	 international	 aid	
worth	US$4.5	billion	allowed	the	country	to	avoid	a	deeper	slump	
and	restore	growth,	albeit	at	a	much	slower	rate	than	before	the	
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war.	A	number	of	structural	social	and	economic	problems	have	
also	remained	unsolved	(see	below).
3. Education reforms
The	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 state	 after	 2003	was	 accompanied	 by	
a	major	effort	to	promote	social	modernisation,	with	special	focus	
on	 education.	 Education	 spending	 increased	 substantially	 after	
the	‘Rose	Revolution’11,	and	an	education	reform	programme	was	
launched	with	a	view	to	bringing	the	organisation	of	the	education	
system	closer	to	Western	standards	(including	through	a	gradual	
implementation	of	the	Bologna	system),	increasing	transparency	
(unified	central	entrance	exams	for	universities,	exchange	of	ex-
ecutive	cadres	in	all	universities)	and	improving	the	infrastruc-
tural	base.	Much	emphasis	was	placed	on	promoting	the	knowl-
edge	of	English	among	pupils	and	students,	at	the	expense	of	the	
teaching	of	Russian12.	The	capital	city’s	Ilia	University,	which	was	
established	according	 to	 ‘Anglo-Saxon’	principles	of	 liberal	edu-
cation,	is	currently	the	best	university	in	the	entire	region,	and	
a	symbol	of	those	changes.
Education	has	been	one	of	 the	most	 important	areas	 for	experi-
mentation	and	unconventional	projects	for	the	Georgian	govern-
ment.	In	2010,	a	programme	called	Teach	and	Learn	With	Georgia	
was	launched13,	with	the	objective	of	inviting	ten	thousand	foreign	
11	 From	2.1%	of	the	GDP	in	2003	to	3.2%	of	the	GDP	in	2009,	while	the	GDP	itself	
was	growing	rapidly.	For	comparison,	the	EU-27	countries	spent	around	5%	
on	average	of	their	GDP	on	education	in	2008.
12	 As	 a	measure	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 government’s	 efforts	 to	 promote	
English,	 during	 the	 2010	 high-school	 leaving	 exams	 70%	 of	 pupils	 chose	
English	as	 the	 foreign	 language,	compared	 to	20%	who	chose	Russian.	Cf.	
Interview	with	the	Georgian	minister	for	education,	Dmitry	Shashkin,	on	
Ekho	 Moskvy	 radio	 on	 9	 July	 2011,	 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/
beseda/790284-echo/	(last	accessed	16.11.2011).
13	 Cf.	http://tlg.gov.ge/.	According	to	the	Ministry	of	Education,	around	1500	
teachers	are	expected	to	arrive	under	the	TLG	programme	during	the	school	
year	2011–2012.
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teachers	of	English	to	Georgia	by	2014,	who	would	teach	the	lan-
guage	in	schools	all	over	the	country	for	lodgings	and	pocket	mon-
ey.	 In	another	 initiative,	 the	government	decided	to	give	mobile	
educational	computers	 to	all	first-graders	 (60,000	such	comput-
ers	are	to	be	distributed	to	pupils	throughout	Georgia	during	the	
school	year	2011-12)14.
These	two	programmes	are	characteristic	of	how	the	new	leader-
ship	and	 the	president	personally	prefer	 to	operate.	On	 the	one	
hand,	they	demonstrate	the	new	leaders’	energy	and	creativity	in	
modernising	Georgia,	and	on	the	other	the	‘revolutionary’	faith,	
typical	 of	 the	 Saakashvili	 camp,	 that	 the	 country’s	 structural	
problems	and	its	civilisational	backwardness	can	quickly	be	over-
come	thanks	to	determination	and	good	ideas.	
The	reforms	implemented	by	the	Saakashvili	camp	have	created	
a	unique,	 statist-liberal	 state	model	 in	Georgia,	which	 is	unlike	
the	models	found	in	the	other	former	Soviet	republic	or	those	in	
the	European	Union.	In	a	situation	where	the	post-Soviet	society	
was	passive,	the	private	sector	underdeveloped	and	the	civil	so-
ciety	institutions	weak,	the	new	Georgian	state	–	led	by	a	group	
of	people	with	a	clear	sense	of	direction	and	considerable	foreign	
assistance	–	has	become	the	most	important	vehicle	for	modernis-
ing	the	country,	in	both	material	and	social	dimensions.	
Harassment	from	Moscow	put	the	resilience	of	the	‘Georgian	ex-
periment’	to	a	test	in	the	years	that	followed	the	‘Rose	Revolution’.	
Georgia	 has	 largely	managed	 to	 end	 its	 dependence	 on	 natural	
gas	 and	 electricity	 supplies	 from	Russia15,	which	 the	 latter	 had	
14	 The	computers	were	assembled	in	Georgia,	at	a	newly-opened	factory	built	
in	co-operation	with	Intel.	In	the	future,	the	factory	is	expected	to	assemble	
up	to	one	million	computers	a	year	for	export.	Cf.	http://www.mes.gov.ge/
content.php?id=2543&lang=eng	(last	accessed	16	November	2011).
15	 In	2005,	Georgia	imported	100%	of	its	gas	from	Russia;	currently	it	imports	
80%	 from	Azerbaijan	 and	 19%	 from	 Russia	 (partly	 as	 payment	 of	 transit	
charges	 for	 gas	 sent	 by	 Russia	 to	 Armenia).	 Georgia	 also	 used	 to	 import	
electricity	from	Russia,	but	currently	it	exports	electricity	to	all	four	neigh-
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previously	been	used	as	instruments	of	political	pressure.	Despite	
significant	losses,	Georgia	also	survived	the	Russian	embargo	on	
its	exports	of	wine	and	mineral	water16.	The	final	test	came	with	
the	war	of	August	2008,	in	which	Georgia	was	defeated	not	only	
militarily,	 but	 also	politically,	 and	 consequently	 the	 fundamen-
tal	assumptions	of	Tbilisi’s	post-revolutionary	policy	were	called	
into	 question.	 The	war	 considerably	 reduced	 Georgia’s	 chances	
of	reintegrating	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia,	and	of	closer	inte-
gration	with	NATO;	exposed	the	limitations	of	the	alliance	with	
the	United	States,	leading	to	a	loosening	of	mutual	ties	(in	which	
the	change	of	administration	in	the	US	was	also	a	factor);	under-
mined	Mikheil	Saakashvili’s	reliability	in	the	eyes	of	his	Western	
partners;	and	finally,	dented	the	prestige	of	the	army,	the	recon-
struction	of	which	had	been	one	of	the	symbols	of	the	post-2003	
reforms.	Yet	in	spite	of	all	this,	Georgia	neither	collapsed	nor	went	
into	a	political	crisis.	As	one	author	and	critic	of	the	government	
has	admitted,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	war	“Georgia	has	lost	some	
territory	and	gained	some	refugees.	Other	than	that,	nothing	of	
significance	has	changed”17.	
bouring	countries.	Source:	Georgian	Economy	Overview,	April	2011.
16	 In	 2005,	 Georgian	wine	 exports	were	worth	US$81.3	million.	 In	 2011,	 the	
value	of	exports	fell	to	US$54.1	million	even	though	the	quality	of	wine	had	
improved	and	Georgia	had	diversified	its	export	markets.	Source:	Geostat.
17	 “Czekając	na	mesjasza”,	 interview	with	Zaza	Burchuladze,	Rzeczpospolita,	
9	 September	 2011.	 http://www.rp.pl/artykul/714696.html	 (last	 accessed	
19	November	2011).
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ii. thE political systEm
1. The ruling group
The	‘Rose	Revolution’	opened	up	a	new	chapter	in	Georgia’s	his-
tory,	and	launched	a	wave	of	profound	changes	in	nearly	all	ar-
eas	of	social	life.	The	group	of	reformers	brought	to	power	by	the	
revolution,	especially	 its	 leader	and	symbol,	President	Mikheil	
Saakashvili,	have	had	a	crucial	say	in	determining	the	shape	and	
content	of	those	changes	for	over	eight	years.	Since	he	took	of-
fice	in	January	2004,	Saakashvili	has	had	a	decisive	influence	on	
the	formation	of	the	the	state	apparatus,	the	political	system,	the	
business	environment,	 the	media	 landscape,	 and	more.	As	 the	
main	 architect	 of	 and	 the	 executive	 force	behind	 the	 reforms,	
the	president	has	dominated	public	 life	 in	Georgia,	both	in	the	
personal	dimension	(most	public	institutions	and	the	media,	as	
well	 as	 large	 sections	of	 the	 economy	and	business	 are	 staffed	
with	the	president’s	current	or	former	aides)	and	at	the	level	of	
ideas	 (setting	 the	 agenda,	 defining	 the	 directions	 of	 develop-
ment).	As	a	result,	full	power	in	Georgia,	formal	and	informal,	
has	been	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	President	Saakashvili	and	
a	 narrow	 circle	 of	 his	 closest	 aides,	which	has	 remained	 rela-
tively	stable	despite	a	number	of	spectacular	defections.	Despite	
the	long	duration	of	his	tenure,	the	difficult	economic	situation,	
the	 successive	 internal	 crises	 (the	 opposition	protests	 of	 2007,	
2009	and	2011)	and,	most	importantly,	the	lost	war	with	Russia,	
President	Saakashvili	still	holds	a	strong	popular	mandate.	Ac-
cording	 to	 public	 opinion	 polls	 commissioned	 by	 the	National	
Democratic	Institute	and	published	in	October	2011,	the	head	of	
state	enjoys	an	approval	rate	of	64%18.
18	 Cf.	http://pik.tv/ru/news/story/21405-reyting-ndi-partiy-gruzii	(last	acces-
sed	19	October	2011).	The	poll	was	most	probably	conducted	before	Bidzina	
Ivanishvili	declared	that	he	was	starting	his	political	activity	(see	below).
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This	 predominance	 of	 the	 presidential	 camp	over	 all	 aspects	 of	
public	life	in	Georgia	has	led	to	the	development	of	an	arbitrary	
model	of	state	management.	Key	decisions	are	taken	by	the	presi-
dent’s	inner	circle,	often	without	involving	the	formal	structures	
and	 mechanisms	 of	 the	 state	 (and	 nearly	 always	 without	 con-
sulting	the	public),	and	with	visible	disregard	for	the	opposition,	
which	the	ruling	group	perceives	as	either	incompetent	or	collab-
orating	with	Russia.	With	the	exception	of	a	handful	of	ministers,	
the	prime	minister	and	the	government	in	fact	stay	on	the	mar-
gins	of	 the	decision-making	process19.	 Likewise	 the	parliament,	
dominated	by	the	president’s	United	National	Movement,	has	no	
significant	 say,	and	 its	votes	and	debates	only	 serve	 to	 formally	
endorse	decisions	that	have	already	been	taken.	
2. Governance practice versus democratic standards
The	president	 and	 the	 political	 camp	 of	 his	 supporters	 came	 to	
power	pledging	to	repair	the	state,	restore	its	territorial	integrity	
and	democratise	the	political	system.	Despite	the	reforms	imple-
mented	 since	 2004	 to	 expand	 democratic	 freedoms,	 the	 former	
two	objectives	have	clearly	been	the	priority	for	the	new	leader-
ship	since	the	start20.	The	weakness	of	the	system	of	checks	and	
balances	 (the	 opposition,	 independent	media,	 civil	 society),	 the	
focus	on	state	building,	stability	and	security,	and	consequently	
the	 considerable	 centralisation	 of	 power,	 have	 all	 led	 firstly	 to	
a	slowdown	of	political	reform,	and	then	to	the	rise	of	phenomena	
which	clearly	depart	from	the	standards	of	a	democratic	state	and	
the	rule	of	law.	
19	 Between	the	‘Rose	Revolution’	and	the	beginning	of	2012,	Georgia	had	five	
prime	ministers,	six	foreign	ministers,	six	finance	ministers	and	seven	de-
fence	ministers.
20	 Those	aspirations	found	their	symbolic	expression	in	Mikheil	Saakashvili’s	
oath	at	the	tomb	of	king	David	the	Builder,	whose	reign	initiated	the	period	
of	the	Georgian	state’s	greatest	power	between	the	11th	and	the	13th	centuries.	
In	the	oath,	taken	on	the	eve	of	the	inauguration	of	Saakashvili’s	first	term	
as	president,	 the	new	head	of	state	promised	to	build	a	strong	and	united	
Georgia	and	restore	its	territorial	integrity.
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The	most	important	of	those	phenomena	include:
a)	No	clear	separation	between	the	ruling	group	and	the	state	ap-
paratus
Since	 2004,	 President	 Saakashvili’s	 camp	 has	 had	 a	 free	 rein	
in	 deciding	 how	 the	 state	 apparatus	 should	 be	 organised,	 and	
who	should	be	appointed	to	posts	at	all	levels	of	the	administra-
tion.	Many	institutions	were	built	from	scratch	after	the	 ‘Rose	
Revolution’,	and	are	inextricably	connected	with	the	people	who	
were	 in	charge	of	 their	reform.	Moreover,	many	civil	servants	
are	also	members	of	the	ruling	party.	This	blurs	the	boundaries	
between	political	structures	and	the	state,	creates	the	risk	of	the	
state	being	appropriated	by	one	political	group,	and	 leaves	 the	
state	prone	 to	 exploitation	 for	political	 ends.	During	 the	 Janu-
ary	2008	presidential	elections,	the	scale	of	irregularities	(con-
sisting	in	active	use	of	the	state	apparatus	during	the	campaign	
and	the	voting	itself)	was	such	that	 it	 led	to	criticism	from	in-
ternational	 institutions	and	allegations	of	electoral	 fraud	from	
the	opposition	(whose	members	accused	the	president	of	having	
added	several	percent	of	votes	to	his	showing	in	order	to	avoid	
a	second	round	of	voting).	The	local	elections	in	May	2010	gen-
erally	received	positive	assessments	from	international	observ-
ers,	 although	numerous	 irregularities	were	also	 reported	dur-
ing	that	ballot.	According	to	a	report	by	the	Georgian	branch	of	
Transparency	 International,	 large	 numbers	 of	 public	 officials,	
who	were	 formally	on	 leave	at	 that	 time,	were	 involved	 in	 the	
campaign	and	used	their	offices,	office	phones	and	cars	for	cam-
paign	purposes.21
21	 Cf.	Transparency	International	Georgia.	The Use of Administrative Resourc-
es for Election Campaign 2010. Local Self-Government Elections Final Report. 
http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/Final%20Re-
port%20on%20AAR_ENG_0.pdf	(last	accessed	13	October	2011).
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b)	Informal	government	sway	over	the	media
Freedom	of	speech	is	assured	in	Georgia:	there	are	independent	
newspapers,	radio	stations	and	online	media.	However,	as	in	the	
other	former	Soviet	countries,	television	remains	the	main	source	
of	information	for	the	Georgian	public.	The	private	television	sta-
tions	 Rustavi	 2	 and	 Imedi,	 the	 only	 TV	 channels	with	 national	
reach	 apart	 from	 the	 public	 TV	 Channel	 1,	 are	 the	most	 popu-
lar,	 and	 they	 take	a	 clearly	pro-government	 line22.	Even	 though	
both	Rustavi	2	and	Imedi	are	formally	independent	of	the	state,	
in	practice	 the	ownership	of	both	 televisions	 is	unclear	 (Rusta-
vi	2	is	owned	by	two	companies	registered	in	the	Virgin	Islands	
and	the	Marshall	Islands).	This,	combined	with	their	clearly	pro-
government	character,	has	led	to	speculation	that	these	channels	
are	 covertly	 controlled	 by	 the	 ruling	 camp	 (Imedi’s	 CEO	Giorgi	
Arveladze	has	formerly	served	as	the	minister	for	economy	and	
has	worked	as	a	presidential	aide)23.	Critics	of	the	ruling	group	are	
allowed	very	limited	access	to	those	media	outlets.
c)	‘Elite’	corruption
One	 of	 the	 greatest	 achievements	 of	 the	 ‘Rose	 Revolution’	 has	
been	 to	eradicate	corruption	almost	completely	 from	the	every-
day	lives	of	citizens.	In	May	2011,	97%	of	respondents	replied	‘no’	
to	the	question	“Did	you	have	to	pay	a	bribe	to	obtain	an	admin-
istrative	decision	or	service	during	the	last	12	months?”24.	At	the	
22	 In	an	opinion	poll	carried	out	in	April	2011,	the	news	services	of	the	different	
television	stations	were	deemed	clearly	pro-government	by	53%	(Rustavi	2),	43%	
(Imedi)	and	48%	(Channel	1)	of	respondents	respectively.	Cf.	The	Caucasus	Re-
search	Resource	Centers,	‘Georgian	Model	as	seen	by	Georgians’,	May	2011.
23	 Transparency	 International	Georgia,	 ‘Television	 in	Georgia	–	Ownership,	
Control	and	Regulation’,	20	November	2009;	http://transparency.ge/sites/
default/files/Media%20Ownership%20November%202009%20Eng.pdf	
(last	accessed	20	November	2011).
24	 Cf.	Georgian	National	Study,	26	April-4	May	2011,	International	Republican	
Institute,	 Baltic	 Surveys	 Ltd.	 /	 The	Gallup	Organization,	 The	 Institute	 of	
Polling	And	Marketing,	p.	9.
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same	 time,	 however,	 there	 is	 much	 speculation	 about	 corrupt	
practices	within	the	power	elite.	Such	practices	allegedly	include	
close	 links	between	the	ruling	group	and	big	business25,	as	well	
as	undisclosed	control	by	members	of	 the	ruling	elite	of	 impor-
tant	Georgian	 enterprises.	The	opaque	ownership	 structures	 of	
many	important	enterprises	 in	Georgia,	which	are	often	owned	
by	companies	registered	in	tax	heavens,	favour	such	speculation.	
According	to	a	member	of	the	Georgian	branch	of	Transparency	
International,	 quoted	 in	 a	 report	 by	 the	 Carnegie	 Endowment,	
“Once	you	get	above	a	certain	level,	you	always	seem	to	end	up	in	
Cyprus	or	a	P.O.	box	in	the	Bahamas”26.	
d)	Lack	of	a	fully	independent	judiciary	
Even	though	a	number	of	regulatory	changes	have	been	enacted	
to	 buttress	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 judiciary	 (judges	 are	 now	
nominated	for	life,	attempts	to	pressure	the	jury	are	penalised,	
and	judges’	salaries	have	increased	several-fold),	the	independ-
ence	 of	 judges	 in	Georgia	 remains	 problematic.	 Large	 sections	
of	 the	 public	 (43%	 of	 citizens,	 according	 to	 a	 May	 2011	 poll27)	
perceive	the	courts	as	more	or	less	‘politically	available’.	On	the	
one	hand,	 this	 perception	 stems	 from	 the	 existence	 of	 instru-
ments	with	which	 the	 government	 is	 able	 to	 discipline	 judges	
(after	their	nomination,	 judges	have	to	serve	a	 three-year	pro-
bation	period,	and	may	be	permanently	moved	from	their	cur-
rent	post	to	any	court	in	Georgia,	without	being	consulted	about	
it	and	without	having	to	give	consent28);	and	on	the	other,	from	
25	 Cf.	for	example	‘Political	Party.	Finance	Report’,	Transparency	Internation-
al	–	Georgia,	Tbilisi	2011.	http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_at-
tachments/TI-G-PartyFinance-ENG.pdf	(last	accessed	20	November	2011).
26	 Quoted	after:	Thomas	de	Waal,	Georgia’s	choices.	Charting	a	future	in	un-
certain	times,	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace	2011.	http://car-
negieendowment.org/files/georgias_choices.pdf	(last	accessed	20.11.2011).
27	 Cf.	The	Caucasus	Research	Resource	Centers,	 ‘Georgian	Model	as	 seen	by	
Georgians’,	May	2011.
28	 Cf.	“Justice	in	Georgia”,	Georgia	Young	Lawyers’	Association,	Tbilisi	2010.
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the	judges’	“tendency	to	guess	the	government’s	wishes”29,	espe-
cially	in	cases	with	a	political	context.
e)	Excessive	role	of	the	security	structures	
The	new	security	 structures	established	after	 the	 ‘Rose	Revo-
lution’	have	from	the	beginning	been	among	the	most	effective	
state	bodies,	and	have	been	the	most	devoted	to	the	cause	of	re-
building	Georgia.	At	the	same	time,	they	have	always	provided	
direct	backing	to	the	ruling	camp,	and	as	a	result	of	the	national	
interest	being	conflated	with	 the	 interest	of	 the	 ruling	group,	
they	have	also	been	used	for	political	ends.	The	role	of	the	In-
terior	Ministry’s	structures	 in	taking	control	over	the	opposi-
tion	TV	channel	Imedi	in	the	autumn	of	2007	may	serve	as	an	
example.	
Another	problem	concerns	the	lack	of	democratic	oversight	over	
the	activities	of	the	security	structures,	and	the	lack	of	political	
responsibility	for	this.	In	this	context,	the	January	2006	murder	
of	 a	 28-year-old	 banker	 Sandro	 Girgvliani	 by	 off-duty	 Interior	
Ministry	officers,	in	which,	according	to	speculation,	top	Minis-
try	officials	may	also	have	been	implicated,	is	a	symbolic	case.	The	
European	Court	of	Human	Rights	has	ruled	that	the	investigation	
into	that	case	‘manifestly	lacked	the	requisite	independence,	im-
partiality,	objectivity	and	thoroughness’30.	
The	significant	role	played	by	the	security	structures	in	the	coun-
try’s	social	and	political	life,	the	lack	of	any	oversight	of	their	activi-
ties,	the	ease	with	which	the	authorities	resort	to	forceful	methods	
29	 Interview	with	a	member	of	 the	 international	analyst	community	during	
a	study	visit	to	Georgia	in	May	2011.
30	 European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	Case	of	Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia,	
application	no.	25091/07,	Judgment,	Strasbourg	26	April	2011,	http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&session
id=79655442&skin=hudoc-en	(last	accessed	25	November	2011).
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to	resolve	internal	crises,	as	well	as	the	restrictive	regulations31	and	
the	willingness	of	the	enforcement	bodies	and	courts	to	use	them32,	
all	affect	the	atmosphere	of	public	life,	and	have	given	rise	to	allega-
tions	that	Georgia	is	turning	into	a	‘police	state’.	
3. Opposition parties
In	 Georgia	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 opposition	 political	 groups	
whose	traditions	date	back	to	the	1990s,	or	even	the	period	before	
the	break-up	of	 the	Soviet	Union.	However,	 the	bulk	of	 today’s	
opposition	emerged	as	a	result	of	schisms	that	occurred	within	
the	 camp	of	 the	 ‘Rose	Revolution’	 since	 2003,	 and	many	of	 the	
most	recognisable	opposition	politicians	were	Mikheil	Saakash-
vili’s	 close	 aides	 in	 the	past	 (Nino	Burjanadze,	 Irakli	Alasania	
and	others).
Having	contested	the	results	of	the	2008	parliamentary	elections	
due	to	alleged	fraud,	the	opposition	in	Georgia	now	functions	out-
side	parliament.	Formally	a	parliamentary	opposition	group,	the	
Christian	Democratic	Movement	is	commonly	regarded	as	a	‘sys-
temic’	opposition	which	does	not	question	the	presidential	camp’s	
monopoly	on	power33.	More	than	a	dozen	more	or	less	active	op-
position	parties	are	dispersed	outside	the	parliament.	What	they	
have	in	common	is	limited	financial	and	human	resources,	poorly	
developed	structures	outside	the	capital,	and	no	access	to	the	ma-
jor	media.	This	puts	them	in	a	position	which	is	clearly	inferior	to	
31	 The	Georgian	Code	of	Administrative	Misdemeanour	provides	for	the	pos-
sibility	of	administrative	detention	of	up	to	90	days,	among	other	measures.	
Cf.	‘Administrative	Error.	Georgia’s	flawed	system	of	administrative	deten-
tion’,	 Human	 Rights	 Watch	 2012,	 http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/georgia0112ForUpload.pdf	(last	accessed	29	January	2012).
32	 Georgia	has	one	of	the	world’s	highest	prison	populations	per	100,000	in-
habitants.	Cf.	for	example	World	Prison	Population	List	8th	edition,	http://
www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf	
(last	accessed	10	December	2011).
33	 Cf.	for	example	‘Leaked	Cable:	CDM	Mayoral	Candidate	Encouraged	by	Gov’t	to	
Run’,	http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23898	(last	accessed	10	December	2011).
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that	of	the	ruling	elite,	with	its	extensive	administrative,	human	
and	financial	resources	and	access	to	the	media.	Personal	conflicts	
divide	the	opposition,	making	the	situation	even	more	difficult.
The	 opposition	 principally	 emphasises	 the	 authoritarian	 traits	
of	the	Saakashvili	camp’s	rule	and	the	poor	economic	situation	of	
the	general	public.	It	has	criticised	the	repressive	behaviour	of	the	
security	apparatus,	the	arrogance	of	power	and	its	disconnection	
from	 the	 realities	 of	Georgian	 life	 (this	particularly	pertains	 to	
the	president	personally),	and	the	random	and	superficial	nature	
of	many	actions34.	However,	 the	opposition	has	not	been	able	 to	
formulate	a	positive	alternative	vision.	As	a	result,	criticisms	tend	
to	be	personal,	 and	 focus	on	calls	 for	Mikheil	Saakashvili	 to	be	
removed	from	power.	
Since	ideological	issues	are	of	little	importance,	the	main	criteria	
by	which	the	opposition	groups	differentiate	themselves	concern	
their	choice	of	methods	for	political	struggle	and	their	attitudes	
towards	Russia.	Politicians	such	as	Nino	Burjanadze	(the	former	
parliamentary	 speaker),	 are	 ready	 for	more	 or	 less	 open	 co-op-
eration	with	Moscow,	 and	 advocate	 removing	 Saakashvili	 from	
power	through	mass	street	protests.	Government	propaganda	has	
consistently	accused	this	section	of	the	opposition	of	links	to	Rus-
sian	 secret	 services,	 including	 through	 Georgian	 oligarchs	 liv-
ing	in	Russia	and	Western	Europe,	and	members	of	the	criminal	
underground35.	Most	of	the	other	opposition	parties	(such	as	Our	
Georgia/Free	Democrats,	run	by	Georgia’s	former	ambassador	to	
the	UN	Irakli	Alasania,	or	the	Republican	Party)	seek	to	remove	
Saakashvili’s	group	from	power	through	elections,	and	advocate	
34	 The	project	to	enhance	Georgia’s	agricultural	standards	by	inviting	white	
farmers	from	South	Africa	to	settle	in	the	country	is	a	classic	example	of	the	
authorities’	high	creativity,	which	nevertheless	has	produced	little	concrete	
effect.	Cf.	http://www.boers.ge/	(last	accessed	12	December	11).
35	 Cf.	 for	 example	 ‘Robert	 Coalson,	 Burjanadze’s	 husband,	 becomes	 focus	 of	
Georgia	political	intrigue’,	Radio	Free	Europe/Radio	Liberty,	26	March	2009,	
http://www.rferl.org/content/Burjanadzes_Husband_Becomes_Focus_Of_
Georgian_Political_Intrigue/1563251.html	(last	accessed	13	December	2011).
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a	continuation	of	the	pro-Western	course.	Nevertheless,	the	rul-
ing	group	has	in	fact	monopolised	the	rhetoric	of	modernisation	
and	integration	with	the	West,	which	makes	it	even	more	difficult	
for	the	opposition	groups	to	reach	and	be	noticed	by	the	electorate	
outside	the	big	cities.	
Because	of	its	fragmentation	and	reactive	approach	to	the	govern-
ment’s	moves,	the	opposition	enjoys	only	limited	public	support.	
Even	 though	 the	 potential	 for	 discontent	 is	 significant	 (mainly	
because	of	social	issues	such	as	unemployment,	poverty,	growing	
social	inequalities	etc.),	the	public,	fatigued	by	the	futility	of	anti-
government	 street	protests	 in	previous	years,	perceives	 the	op-
position	as	unconstructive,	bereft	of	ideas	of	how	to	carry	on	the	
political	struggle,	and	essentially	unprepared	to	take	over	power	
in	Georgia.	
4. A new political player
A	new	player	on	the	Georgian	political	scene	is	Bidzina	Ivanish-
vili,	the	richest	man	in	Georgia,	with	assets	worth	an	estimated	
US$6.4	billion	(corresponding	to	more	than	half	of	Georgia’s	an-
nual	GDP),	who	unexpectedly	announced	his	entry	into	politics	in	
October	2011.	Unlike	the	opposition	parties,	he	has	the	potential	
to	challenge	the	ruling	group’s	monopolistic	position36.	His	ambi-
36	 As	 in	the	other	former	Soviet	countries,	 the	active	 involvement	of	the	so-
called	 oligarchs	 in	 politics	 is	 not	 a	 new	 phenomenon	 in	 Georgia.	 Badri	
(Arkadi)	Patarkatsishvili,	a	Georgian	billionaire	who	operated	in	Russia	in	
the	1990s,	is	a	figure	who	resembles	Bidzina	Ivanishvili	in	many	respects.	
Because	of	his	close	links	to	the	Russian	oligarch	Boris	Berezovsky,	who	was	
in	conflict	with	Vladimir	Putin,	Patarkatsishvili	returned	to	Georgia	in	2001	
where	he	used	his	immense	wealth	(estimated	at	US$12	billion)	to	develop	
large-scale	business	and	charitable	activities.	Dissatisfied	with	the	reforms	
implemented	 after	 the	 ‘Rose	Revolution’,	which	undermined	his	 business	
interests,	Patarkatsishvili	moved	over	to	the	oppo	sition	against	Saakash-
vili;	he	financed	the	anti-government	protests	in	autumn	2007,	among	other	
ventures,	and	harshly	criticised	the	ruling	group	in	his	media	(mainly	Ime-
di	television).	He	also	challenged	Mikheil	Saakashvili	as	a	presidential	can-
didate	in	the	elections	of	January	2008.	Thanks	to	his	huge	wealth,	personal	
influence,	links	to	the	Russian	government	and	business,	and	the	fact	that	
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tion	is	to	defeat	the	president’s	United	National	Movement	in	the	
upcoming	parliamentary	elections	and	form	a	new	government.	
Ivanishvili	 intends	 the	 newly	 founded	 Georgian	 Dream	 public	
movement	and	the	Georgian	Dream	–	Democratic	Georgia	opposi-
tion	party	to	be	his	political	vehicles.	
Ivanishvili	earned	his	money	in	the	opaque	business	environment	
of	Russia	in	the	1990s.	Before	returning	to	Georgia,	he	carried	out	
large-scale	activities	in	the	banking,	metallurgic	and	other	sectors	
in	Russia.	After	 the	 ‘Rose	Revolution’	he	was	awarded	Georgian	
citizenship	by	President	Saakashvili	and	resettled	in	Georgia,	al-
though	he	kept	some	of	his	Russian	assets.	According	to	uncon-
firmed	reports,	Ivanishvili	supported	the	authorities	financially	
for	many	years	after	returning	to	Georgia,	which,	if	true,	would	
make	him	fit	the	pattern	whereby	the	new	Georgian	government	
‘amnestied’	Georgian	oligarchs	in	return	for	their	financial	sup-
port.	 The	 billionaire	 has	 gained	 recognition	 and	 popularity	 in	
Georgia	thanks	to	his	large-scale	charitable	activities	and	his	sup-
port	for	the	Georgian	Orthodox	Church,	even	though	Ivanishvili	
has	 consistently	 avoided	 the	media	or	making	any	public	 state-
ments,	and	has	been	surrounded	by	an	atmosphere	of	secrecy.	He	
is	believed	for	many	years	to	have	financed	grants	for	members	
of	the	Georgian	intelligentsia	who	were	impoverished	as	a	result	
of	the	transformation.	According	to	unconfirmed	reports,	he	has	
also	financed	the	construction	of	the	Holy	Trinity	Cathedral,	the	
largest	religious	building	in	the	Southern	Caucasus,	which	rises	
above	Tbilisi.
When	Ivanishvili	declared	that	he	was	entering	politics,	opposi-
tion	 groups	 started	 to	 seek	 his	 favour	 and	 opportunities	 to	 co-
operate	with	 him.	 The	 authorities	 also	 responded	 immediately:	
Ivanishvili	was	stripped	of	his	Georgian	citizenship,	as	a	result	of	
he	possessed	his	own	media,	Patarkatsishvili	posed	the	greatest	challenge	
to	the	Saakashvili	group	since	the	‘Rose	Revolution’.	In	February	2008,	he	
unexpectedly	died	of	a	heart	attack	in	London.
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which	he	cannot	legally	engage	in	politics	or	finance	parties37,	and	
the	National	Bank	of	Georgia	opened	an	investigation	into	alleged	
money	laundering	by	his	Cartu	Bank.	Meanwhile,	members	of	the	
ruling	group	have	started	to	publicly	accuse	the	billionaire	of	act-
ing	on	orders	from,	and	in	the	interest	of,	Russia.
Little	 is	 known	 about	 Ivanishvili’s	 views.	 His	 statements	 sug-
gest	 that	he	supports	both	a	pro-Western	orientation,	 including	
Georgia’s	future	accession	to	NATO,	and	closer	relations	with	Rus-
sia.	However,	his	policy	declarations	have	been	very	general	and	
populist	in	nature.	The	political	parties	he	has	chosen	as	his	main	
partners,	the	Republican	Party	and	Alasania’s	Our	Georgia/Free	
Democrats,	 represent	 the	pro-Western	option	and	are	 recognis-
able	and	reliable	potential	partners	for	the	West.	However,	Ivan-
ishvili’s	circle	also	includes	some	members	of	the	old	regime,	from	
the	period	of	Eduard	Shevardnadze’s	rule.	Moreover,	the	fact	that	
Ivanishvili	has	long	been	doing	business	in	Russia,	and	the	scale	
of	his	business	activities,	engender	speculations	that	he	might	be	
implicated	 in	murky	 business	 and	 political	 relations	 in	 Russia.	
Thus,	the	new	political	force	that	the	billionaire	is	building	up	is	
in	many	ways	non-transparent	and	unpredictable,	both	with	re-
gard	to	its	policy	issues	and	the	question	of	who	will	ultimately	
have	the	decisive	say	in	it.	
It’s	difficult	to	say	why	Ivanishvili	has	made	this	sudden	turn.	His	
actions	 so	 far	 demonstrate	 a	 lack	 of	 political	 experience	 or	 any	
clear	strategy	of	action.	Nevertheless,	his	emergence	on	the	politi-
cal	scene	poses	a	serious	challenge	to	the	ruling	group.	A	number	
of	factors	predispose	Ivanishvili	to	play	a	major	role	in	Georgian	
politics,	 either	 personally	 if	 he	 regains	 his	 citizenship,	 or	 indi-
rectly	 if	not.	These	 factors	 include	his	huge	financial	resources,	
37	 Ivanishvili	was	stripped	of	his	citizenship	under	the	pretext	that,	already	
a	citizen	of	Georgia	and	Russia,	he	had	recently	adopted	a	third,	French	citi-
zenship,	as	he	announced	in	one	of	his	statements.	According	to	the	 legal	
interpretation	presented	by	the	authorities,	this	automatically	entailed	the	
expiry	of	his	Georgian	citizenship.
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a	positive	public	image	and	good	relations	with	the	Georgian	Or-
thodox	Church.	Knowledge	about	 the	 relations	and	connections	
within	the	ruling	elite	is	also	an	important	asset	in	Ivanishvili’s	
political	capital,	which	he	is	using	by	sending	signals	to	key	mem-
bers	of	 the	ruling	group	that	he	could	offer	a	safe	alternative	to	
Mikheil	 Saakashvili.	 The	 billionaire	 also	 benefits	 from	 the	 ex-
pectations	of	the	EU	and	the	United	States	that	the	campaign	and	
voting	in	the	next	parliamentary	elections	should	present	major	
progress	in	terms	of	democratic	standards,	which	limits	the	cur-
rent	Georgian	leadership’s	room	for	manoeuvre.
5. Other public actors
a)	The	Orthodox	Church
The	Georgian	Orthodox	Church,	and	especially	Patriarch	Ilia	II	who	
has	been	leading	the	Church	since	1977,	are	very	important	actors	
in	Georgia’s	political	life,	even	if	they	seldom	take	the	limelight.	Or-
thodox	Christianity	is	a	constitutive	element	of	Georgian	national	
identity,	and	the	importance	of	religion	in	social	life	has	been	grow-
ing	steadily	since	Georgia	regained	independence	in	1991.	
The	 Orthodox	 Church	 and	 the	 Patriarch	 are	 the	 most	 trusted	
public	 institutions	and	enjoy	great	authority.	As	the	Papal	Nun-
cio	Claudio	Gugerotti	 allegedly	said,	 „If	 the	people	are	 forced	 to	
choose,	they	will	choose	the	church	over	the	government”38.	The	
special	status	of	the	Orthodox	Church	is	regulated	by	an	accord	
concluded	in	2002	between	the	state	and	the	Church	(commonly	
referred	to	as	the	‘concordat’).
The	church	is	ostensibly	conservative	on	moral	issues,	open	about	
its	aversion	to	other	confessions,	and	distrustful	of	the	West39.	Be-
38	 Georgia:	 impossible	 to	govern	without	God	and	Bible,	http://www.wikile-
aks.org/cable/2008/12/08TBILISI2269.html	(last	accessed	14.12.2011).
39	 Cf.	 for	 example	 the	 patriarch’s	 call	 to	 refrain	 from	 sending	 children	 to	
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cause	of	 the	 growing	 importance	of	 the	 church	 in	Georgia’s	 so-
cial	life	in	recent	years,	many	observers	claim	that	the	effective	
modernisation	of	 the	 state	after	 2003	has	been	accompanied	by	
a	 traditionalist	backlash	 in	 social	 life	and	public	morals.	At	 the	
same	 time,	 church	organisations	 (such	as	 charities)	 remain	 the	
most	important	platform	of	social	activity	for	the	Georgian	public.	
The	 great	 authority	 enjoyed	by	 the	 church	 is	 visible	 in	 the	 fact	
that	during	the	country’s	major	political	crises	(such	as	the	mass	
opposition	protests	 in	 2007	and	2009),	 the	government,	 the	op-
position	and	a	majority	of	the	public	turned	to	the	Patriarch	for	
mediation	and	assistance	in	resolving	the	tensions.	
While	the	church	is	not	directly	involved	in	politics,	it	has	so	far	
taken	the	side	of	the	status quo during	crises,	in	effect	the	side	of	
the	government.	However,	the	church	has	preserved	a	strong	and	
independent	position	towards	the	ruling	group,	and	has	vocally	
expressed	 its	 discontent	whenever	 it	 saw	fit.	 The	 church	 is	 the	
only	social	institution	whose	opinion	the	government	has	to	take	
into	account,	and	whose	favours	it	actively	needs	to	seek	–	because	
these	cannot	be	taken	for	granted,	as	demonstrated	by	the	Patri-
arch’s	appeal	for	Bidzina	Ivanishvili’s	citizenship	to	be	restored.	
Because	of	 its	 traditionally	 close	 relations	with	 the	Russian	Or-
thodox	Church,	critics	often	consider	the	Georgian	church	(or	at	
least	a	considerable	proportion	of	its	high	clergy)	to	have	links	to	
Russia	or	even	to	represent	Russian	interests.	At	the	same	time,	
however,	the	church,	and	Ilia	II	personally,	have	clearly	distanced	
themselves	 from	Russian	policy	and	adopted	a	stance	on	 the	 is-
sue	of	reintegrating	South	Ossetia	and	Abkhazia	which	is	closer	
to	that	of	the	Georgian	government40.	
schools	abroad	because,	being	 immature,	 they	could	be	 influenced	by	 the	
wrong	role	models.	Patriarch:	‘Refrain	from	Sending	Kids	Abroad	for	Edu-
cation,	03	October	10,	http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22722	(last	accessed	
14.12.2011).
40	 For	 example,	 the	 joint	 visit	 in	August	 2006	 by	 the	 President	 and	 the	 Pa-
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The	fact	that	Ilia	II’s	stance	towards	Georgia’s	European	and	Euro-
Atlantic	aspirations	is	moderately	favourable	–	despite	his	and	his	
church’s	distrust	of	Western	culture	and	values	–	is	a	valuable	as-
set	for	the	ruling	group.	Therefore	the	question	of	who	will	suc-
ceed	Ilia	II	(who	is	now	79	years	old)	as	leader	of	the	church	will	
be	very	important	for	the	country’s	future.	If	an	anti-Western	and	
pro-Russian	 cleric	 becomes	 the	 next	 patriarch	 then,	 even	 if	 he	
does	not	enjoy	as	much	authority	as	Ilia	II,	it	will	be	more	difficult	
for	the	Georgian	leadership	to	continue	its	pro-Western	course.
b)	The	‘third	sector’
Under	Eduard	Shevardnadze,	Georgia	had	an	extensive	and	ac-
tive	 ‘third	sector’	which	played	a	major	role	 in	 the	 ‘Rose	Revo-
lution’.	When	Mikheil	Saakashvili	came	to	power,	non-govern-
mental	organisations	became	a	human	resource	pool	for	the	new	
authorities,	and	many	prominent	members	of	the	ruling	group	
entered	the	world	of	politics	from	the	NGO	sector.	The	outflow	
of	qualified	individuals	from	NGOs	to	the	state	administration,	
and	 the	 decrease	 in	 funding	 available	 to	 them	 (many	 donors	
transferred	their	funds	to	governmental	programmes	after	the	
revolution)	have	considerably	weakened	the	effectiveness	of	the	
NGO	sector	in	Georgia.	Although	NGOs	in	Georgia	are	numerous	
and	enjoy	much	better	conditions	than	in	any	other	neighbour-
hood	post-Soviet	country,	in	fact	they	operate	on	a	much	smaller	
scale	 and	 are	markedly	 less	 active	 than	 before	 the	 revolution.	
Given	the	weakness	and	fragmentation	of	the	Georgian	opposi-
tion,	the	weakness	of	the	NGO	sector	poses	an	additional	prob-
lem	for	Georgian	democracy41.
triarch	 to	 the	village	of	Chkhalta	 in	 the	Kodori	Gorge;	until	August	2008	
this	was	a	part	of	Abkhazia	controlled	by	Tbilisi,	and	the	seat	of	the	loyalist	
government	of	the	Autonomous	Republic	of	Abkhazia,	an	alternative	to	the	
separatist	authorities	in	Sukhumi.
41	 An	extensive	report	on	the	current	condition	of	Georgia’s	NGO	sector	can	
be	 found	 here:	 http://www.cipdd.org/files/40_631_536365_Civicus-Geor-
giaACR-eng.pdf	(last	accessed	14	December	2011).
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c)	Informal	groups
It	 remains	an	open	question	how	much	power	and	 influence	 is	
in	the	hands	of	informal	groups,	especially	the	oligarchs	whom	
Saakashvili	 forced	 into	 emigration,	 leaders	 of	 the	 organised	
criminal	underground,	and	former	high-ranking	state	officials,	
including	 secret	 service	 officers	whom	 the	 government	has	 re-
peatedly	 accused	 of	 trying	 to	 destabilise	 Georgia.	 Attempts	 by	
such	groups	to	influence	the	situation	in	Georgia	have	been	de-
scribed	by	 the	German	newspaper	Frankfurter Rundschau	 in	an	
article	 which	 quoted	 a	 confidential	 report	 from	 the	 Austrian	
criminal	police.	This	document	shows	that	Georgian	criminal	or-
ganisations	operating	in	Western	Europe	are	co-operating	with	
Igor	Giorgadze,	the	former	security	minister	of	Georgia	(1993-5)	
who	now	lives	in	Moscow,	to	destabilise	the	internal	situation	in	
Georgia	with	a	view	to	toppling	the	current	leadership.	Georgian	
criminal	organisations	allegedly	supported	the	opposition	street	
protests	 in	 the	 spring	 and	 summer	 of	 2009,	 and	 bribed	 high-
ranking	state	officials42.	
42	 Andreas	 Förster,	 ‘Georgiens	 Mafia	 plante	 Umsturz’,	 Frankfurter Rundschau,	
22	 June	 2011,	 http://www.fr-online.de/politik/wiener-ermittler-georgiens-
mafia-plante-umsturz,1472596,4481758.html	(last	accessed	14	December	2011).
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iii. QuEstions about GEorGia’s futurE
The	next	parliamentary	elections	will	be	held	 in	Georgia	 in	Oc-
tober	2012.	The	ballot	will	be	the	first	national	elections	since	the	
war	with	 Russia.	 It	will	 offer	 the	 voters	 an	 opportunity	 to	 call	
the	government	to	account	for	the	2008	conflict	and	for	the	four-
year	post-war	period.	They	will	also	end	the	stagnation	which	has	
prevailed	in	Georgia’s	political	scene	since	the	war,	and	will	start	
a	period	of	intense	political	struggle	that	will	only	end	with	the	
presidential	 elections	 in	 2013	 and	Mikheil	 Saakashvili’s	 depar-
ture	from	office.
1. New legal realities
The	elections	will	take	place	in	a	new	legal	reality:	under	a	new	
electoral	code,	and	with	the	prospect	of	a	constitutional	amend-
ment	coming	 into	 force	 that	will	alter	 the	relationship	between	
the	different	branches	of	government	(it	will	become	effective	in	
2013,	 after	 Saakashvili	 leaves	 office	 and	 during	 the	 new	parlia-
mentary	term).	
Both	 legislative	 changes	 have	 been	 enacted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 ‘new	
wave	 of	 democratisation’	 announced	 by	 the	 President	 after	 the	
war,	 and	 are	 being	 presented	 by	 the	 government	 as	milestones	
in	the	process	of	bringing	Georgia	closer	to	Western	democratic	
standards.	
The	 new	 electoral	 code	 implements	 a	 number	 of	 recommenda-
tions	presented	by	international	institutions,	and	meets	some	of	
the	demands	voiced	by	the	opposition.	The	OSCE	Office	for	Demo-
cratic	 Institutions	&	Human	Rights	and	the	Venice	Commission	
of	the	Council	of	Europe,	which	have	expressed	opinions	on	the	
draft,	have	stated	that	it	is	conducive	to	democratic	elections,	and	
includes	many	positive	elements.	However,	they	have	also	criti-
cised	Georgia	 for	 failing	 to	enact	 the	anticipated	changes	 to	 the	
definition	of	single-mandate	electoral	districts,	which	account	for	
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almost	half	of	the	seats	in	the	parliament.	The	geography	of	those	
districts,	 whose	 size	 varies	 from	 several	 thousand	 to	 little	 less	
than	one	hundred	thousand	voters	 in	some	cases,	clearly	works	
in	favour	of	the	still	very	popular	ruling	party,	which	won	in	71	of	
the	75	single-mandate	districts	in	the	2008	elections.
With	 the	 constitutional	 amendment	 of	 October	 2010	 (adopted	
partly	in	response	to	calls	from	the	international	community	to	
limit	 the	president’s	powers	and	 strengthen	 the	prerogatives	of	
the	parliament43),	Georgia	will	move	from	a	presidential	system	
of	 government	 towards	 a	 parliamentary-cabinet	 arrangement.	
When	 the	 reform	 comes	 into	 force,	 the	 president	 will	 remain	
the	 head	 of	 state,	 but	 many	 of	 the	 presidential	 powers	 will	 be	
transferred	to	the	government,	which	will	become	the	supreme	
executive	 authority	 for	 both	 internal	 and	 foreign	 policy.	Under	
the	amended	constitution,	the	president	will	no	longer	have	the	
power	to	arbitrarily	designate	candidates	for	prime	minister	(the	
candidate	will	be	designated	by	the	party	winning	the	election),	
approve	the	nominations	of	ministers,	dismiss	 the	government,	
appoint	the	defence	and	interior	ministers,	or	suspend	and	repeal	
the	government’s	decisions.	The	prime	minister	will	have	exclu-
sive	influence	over	the	nominations	of	governors	and	the	power	
to	 countersign	 presidential	 nominations	 of	 army	 commanders	
and	 ambassadors,	 and	 presidential	 decrees.	 Overturning	 the	
president’s	 veto	 will	 require	 an	 absolute	 majority	 of	 votes,	 in-
stead	of	the	qualified	three-fifths	majority	required	currently.	As	
a	nuance,	the	amended	constitution	will	provide	for	an	unusually	
complex	and	long	procedure	for	a	vote	of	no	confidence,	in	which	
the	president,	rather	than	the	parliament,	will	in	fact	play	a	key	
role44.	This	suggests	 that	 the	projected	changes	to	the	system	of	
43	 Strengthening	the	parliament’s	powers	was	recommended	in	the	EU-Geor-
gia	Action	Plan	adopted	in	2006,	among	others.
44	 Cf.	Final	opinion	on	the	draft	constitutional	law	on	amendments	and	changes	
to	the	constitution	of	Georgia,	adopted	by	the	Venice	Commission	at	its	84th	
Plenary	 Session	 (Venice,	 15-16	 October	 2010),	 http://www.venice.coe.int/
docs/2010/CDL-AD%282010%29028-e.pdf	(last	accessed	16	December	2011).
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government	will	mainly	 shift	powers	between	 the	different	ex-
ecutive	 authorities,	 while	 preserving	 the	 executive’s	 privileged	
position	regarding	the	legislature.	
2. The importance of the elections
The	upcoming	parliamentary	 and	presidential	 elections	will	 be	
a	test	of	the	stability	and	maturity	of	the	Georgian	state	and	po-
litical	 system,	which	will	 probe	 the	 government’s	 commitment	
to	democratic	 ideals,	 the	 impartiality	of	 state	 institutions,	pub-
lic	support	for	Georgia’s	current	political	course,	the	opposition’s	
readiness	to	participate	in	democratic	processes,	and	the	political	
maturity	of	the	general	public.
Before	the	oligarch	Bidzina	Ivanishvili	made	his	political	debut,	
the	 outcome	 of	 the	 parliamentary	 elections	 in	 October	 seemed	
to	have	been	already	decided;	the	opposition	was	weak	and	dis-
persed,	 and	 lacked	 popularity	 despite	 the	 significant	 potential	
for	public	discontent,	whereas	the	ruling	group	was	consolidated,	
possessed	significant	resources	and	was	perceived	as	having	no	
alternative	 to	 it,	 despite	 the	growing	 fatigue	with	 the	Saakash-
vili	camp.	The	only	unknown	was	whether	the	leadership	would	
really	opt	for	a	‘qualitative	breakthrough’,	in	terms	of	abiding	by	
democratic	standards	during	the	campaign	and	during	the	ballot.	
The	challenge	Ivanishvili	has	posed	has	radically	changed	the	sit-
uation;	a	new	player	has	appeared	on	the	stage	with	considerable	
assets,	 including	 impressive	 wealth,	 considerable	 social	 capital	
built	up	through	his	charity	activities,	and	an	extensive	network	
of	contacts	in	Georgia,	Russia	and	the	West	–	and	with	whom	the	
current	leadership	has	to	reckon.	Thus,	the	outcome	of	the	elec-
tions	is	no	longer	a	foregone	conclusion.	
If	 the	 political	 movement	 created	 by	 Ivanishvili	 takes	 part	 in	
the	elections,	it	will	 likely	pose	a	serious	challenge	to	the	Presi-
dent’s	United	National	Movement,	with	good	chances	of	success-
fully	mobilising	and	winning	over	those	sections	of	the	electorate	
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which	do	not	support	the	government.	However,	since	the	ruling	
group	still	enjoys	wide	popularity,	and	Ivanishvili	clearly	has	no	
political	 experience	or	vision,	 the	 likelihood	 that	he	will	defeat	
the	presidential	camp	seems	low.	It	seems	that	the	most	the	op-
position	 could	 achieve	would	 be	 to	 deprive	 the	 ruling	 party	 of	
its	 absolute	majority	 in	 the	parliament	which,	 in	 the	 context	of	
the	constitutional	amendments,	would	force	it	to	seek	a	coalition	
partner	–	that	is,	to	share	power.
3. The future of the President
Saakashvili’s	decision	as	to	what	role	he	will	assume	after	leaving	
office	in	2013	will	be	of	decisive	importance	for	Georgia’s	future.	
The	solutions	envisaged	in	the	constitutional	amendment,	and	the	
fact	that	they	will	only	come	into	force	after	the	end	of	his	second	
term,	have	been	fuelling	speculations	 that	he	may	be	 intending	
to	follow	Vladimir	Putin’s	footsteps	and	become	the	head	of	gov-
ernment,	thus	effectively	manipulating	the	principal	democratic	
mechanisms.	
The	 President	 himself	 has	 admitted	 that	 this	was	 theoretically	
possible,	but	has	refused	to	declare	his	intentions	clearly,	claim-
ing	that	if	he	announced	his	withdrawal	from	politics	two	years	
ahead	of	the	end	of	his	term,	this	would	undermine	his	position	
and	pose	a	threat	to	the	planned	reforms45.	Saakashvili’s	age	(he	
will	turn	46	in	2013),	his	popularity,	and	the	absence	of	any	politi-
cian	with	enough	leadership	and	charisma	to	replace	him,	might	
convince	him	to	stay	in	power.	Some	members	of	the	elite	also	ar-
gue	 that	maintaining	 the	 current	political	 course	 for	as	 long	as	
possible	should	be	the	priority	while	the	Russian	threat	remains	
imminent.
45	 Cf.	for	example	interviews	for	Euronews	and	the	Ukrainian	1+1	channel.	http://
www.euronews.net/2011/05/31/saakashvili-the-west-is-only-option/	 (last	 ac-
cessed	16	December	2011)	and	http://tkachenko.ua/video/vypuski/?media_
id=383432334	(last	accessed	16	December	2011).
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However,	such	a	step	would	leave	Georgia	facing	a	knot	of	prob-
lems	 typical	 of	 authoritarian	 countries:	 the	 declining	 popular	
legitimacy	 of	 the	 ruling	 group,	 international	 isolation,	 and	 en-
trenchment	of	the	pathologies	of	power.	Saakashvili’s	decision	to	
stay	in	power	would	also	threaten	to	escalate	tensions	within	the	
elite	because,	according	to	unconfirmed	reports,	a	number	of	key	
members	of	the	ruling	group	oppose	this	step.	
An	 alternative	 scenario	 could	 be	 for	 the	 President	 to	 cease	 ac-
tive	involvement	in	politics,	while	keeping	the	position	of	a	men-
tor	and	informal	arbiter.	Since	the	ruling	party	is	likely	to	retain	
its	dominant	position	on	the	Georgian	political	scene	after	2012,	
such	a	decision	would	open	the	way	to	senior	state	offices	for	other	
members	of	 the	elite.	For	example,	 the	popular	mayor	of	Tbilisi	
Gigi	Ugulava	(who	enjoys	good	relations	with	the	church),	or	the	
current	 parliament	 speaker	 David	 Bakaradze	 have	 been	 men-
tioned	as	potential	candidates	for	president.	This	scenario	would	
also	strengthen	the	position	of	the	interior	minister	Ivane	Mera-
bishvili,	who	is	already	commonly	regarded	as	being	in	charge	of	
the	day-to-day	running	of	the	state.
A	 third	 possible	 scenario,	 which	 is	 currently	 being	 speculated	
upon	 in	 Tbilisi,	 envisages	 the	 President	 assuming	 a	 prominent	
public	post	other	than	that	of	prime	minister,	such	as	the	speak-
er	of	parliament,	or	the	head	of	government	in	the	Autonomous	
Republic	of	Adjara.	In	the	short	term,	such	a	move	would	enable	
Saakashvili	to	retain	considerable	formal	influence	on	Georgia’s	
politics,	 and	 would	 probably	 cause	 less	 controversy	 than	 if	 he	
became	 prime	minister.	 In	 the	 long	 term,	 however,	 this	would	
almost	 inevitably	 lead	to	 tensions	with	 the	 future	prime	minis-
ter	and	president,	and	in	effect	to	political	crises	and	even	splits	
within	the	ruling	camp.	Additionally	the	president	would	surely	
face	 international	and	 internal	accusations	of	manipulating	 the	
democratic	mechanisms.
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4. Unconstitutional scenarios
Considering	the	complexity	of	Georgia’s	internal	and	external	sit-
uation,	unconstitutional	scenarios	cannot	be	ruled	out.	
Mass	protests	are	the	staple	method	of	political	struggle	in	Geor-
gia.	At	the	moment	the	public	appears	to	be	tired	of	this	kind	of	
street	politics,	although	in	the	event	of	a	deterioration	of	economic	
conditions	or	the	appearance	of	post-election	controversies,	a	new	
wave	of	protests	is	entirely	conceivable.	Even	though	the	govern-
ment	is	experienced	in	dealing	with	mass	protests,	such	crises	are	
as	a	rule	unpredictable,	and	potentially	dangerous	for	the	coun-
try’s	stability.
A	 separate	 issue	 concerns	 the	 influence	 of	 Georgia’s	 northern	
neighbour	 on	 the	 country’s	 internal	 situation.	Moscow	 has	 both	
the	necessary	 instruments	and	a	 long	track	record	of	 interfering	
with	Georgia’s	internal	affairs.	Moreover,	it	is	in	Russia’s	strategic	
interest	to	strengthen	its	position	in	the	South	Caucasus	(including	
by	subordinating	Georgia),	because	of	its	need	to	control	the	transit	
routes	for	Caspian	energy	resources,	among	other	objectives.	
Moscow	and	Tbilisi	have	had	no	diplomatic	relations	since	2008,	
and	formally	remain	in	a	state	of	war46.	The	Russian	government	
does	not	recognise	the	current	Georgian	leadership	as	represent-
ative	of	the	country,	and	both	officially	and,	presumably,	unoffi-
cially	has	been	supporting	its	opponents47.
The	Georgian	authorities	and	the	media	associated	with	them	have	
regularly	warned	about	the	possibility	of	a	Russian-inspired	ter-
ror	attack	or	coup.	Over	the	last	two	years,	mysterious	explosions	
46	 Russia	is	currently	occupying	around	20%	of	the	country’s	internationally	
recognised	territory	(Abkhazia,	South	Ossetia).	The	only	formal	document	
ending	the	2008	war	is	the	Medvedev-Sarkozy	ceasefire	agreement.
47	 Cf.	‘Путин готов говорить с ‘конструктивными силами’ в Грузии’,	http://
www.civil.ge/rus/article.php?id=20746	(last	accessed	15	December	2011).
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have	been	reported	in	various	parts	of	Georgia,	including	in	the	
vicinity	of	the	US	embassy	in	Tbilisi.	The	security	structures	have	
also	repeatedly	reported	foiled	attempts	at	bomb	attacks	or	acts	
of	sabotage48.	 In	May	2009,	a	mutiny	took	place	at	 the	tank	bat-
talion	stationed	in	the	Mukhrovani	base	near	Tbilisi	while	mass	
opposition	protests	were	being	held	in	Tbilisi,	which	the	authori-
ties	described	as	 an	attempted	coup.	According	 to	 the	Georgian	
government,	all	those	incidents	were	organised	by	Russian	secret	
services,	 operating	 primarily	 from	 the	 territories	 of	 Abkhazia	
and	South	Ossetia49.
While	Russian	 interference	 in	Georgia’s	 internal	 affairs	 is	 likely,	
and	may	include	support	for	the	opposition	as	well	as	acts	of	sabo-
tage,	it	should	also	be	noted	that	the	Georgian	leadership	has	been	
exploiting	the	Russian	menace	in	order	to	mobilise	public	support	
and	discredit	 the	opposition.	A	TV	programme	aired	by	Imedi	 in	
March	2010,	which	depicted	a	new	Russian	invasion,	the	establish-
ment	of	a	pro-Russian	government	and	the	death	of	Saakashvili	in	
a	broadcast	stylised	as	live	coverage,	may	serve	as	an	example	here.	
Aired	with	no	warnings	that	it	was	a	fictional	programme,	the	pro-
gramme	gave	rise	to	panic	in	Georgia,	and	led	to	harsh	criticism	of	
the	government	both	domestically	and	abroad.	
5. Social and economic problems
The	 condition	 of	 the	 economy	 will	 affect	 how	 the	 situation	 in	
Georgia,	including	the	political	situation,	develops.	Georgia’s	good	
48	 Cf.	 for	 example	 http://police.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=2304,	 http://po-
lice.ge/index.php?m=8&newsid=3101	(last	accessed	20.02.2012).
49	 Tbilisi’s	 version	 is	 corroborated	 by	 a	 series	 of	 articles	 in	 the	Washington 
Times	of	July	2011,	according	to	which	the	question	of	the	explosion	in	the	
vicinity	of	the	US	embassy	was	twice	raised	during	meetings	between	the	
US	secretary	of	state	USA	Hillary	Clinton	and	the	Russian	 foreign	minis-
ter	Sergei	Lavrov	in	the	course	of	2011.	Cf.	Eli	Lake,	‘Clinton	raised	issue	of	
a	Russian	link	to	bombing	in	Georgia’,	Washington Post,	28	July	2011;	http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/28/clinton-raised-issue-of-a-
russian-link-to-bombing-/?page=all	(last	accessed	16	December	2011).
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macroeconomic	performance	after	 2003	has	 scarcely	 translated	
into	better	standards	of	living	for	the	people.	For	years,	mass	un-
employment	has	remained	the	most	important	problem	for	Geor-
gian	society50	(the	official	unemployment	rate	is	16.3%,	but	unoffi-
cially	it	is	much	higher).	No	significant	progress	has	been	reported	
in	the	fight	against	poverty,	which	affects	27.8%	of	the	people	in	
Georgia	according	to	EU	figures51.	Should	the	economic	situation	
deteriorate,	 standards	of	 living	would	dominate	 the	coming	po-
litical	season	and	could	bring	people	into	the	streets.
These	 problems	 expose	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 liberal	 economic	
model	which	until	 now	had	been	 implemented	 as	 economic	 or-
thodoxy,	 and	 require	 corrections	 to	 it.	 The	 foreign	 investments	
which	 the	authorities	hoped	would	bring	dynamic	development	
to	Georgia	are	often	destined	for	the	real	estate	and	the	financial	
sectors	(15%	and	16%	respectively	of	Georgia’s	FDI	in	2010)	and	do	
not	generate	many	jobs,	or,	in	the	case	of	investments	in	transport	
and	 communication	 (35%),	 consist	 of	 large,	 one-off	 infrastruc-
tural	 projects	 financed	 with	 funds	 coming	 from	 international	
aid,	among	other	sources.	The	presence	of	the	Virgin	Islands,	the	
United	Arab	Emirates	and	Cyprus	among	the	top-ten	investors	in	
Georgia	suggests	that	a	considerable	proportion	of	FDI	consists	in	
speculative	capital,	or	Georgian	capital	reinvested	in	Georgia	via	
tax	havens.	
After	2003	Georgia	stopped	pursuing	any	sectoral	economic	poli-
cies,	exacerbating	the	breakdown	of	the	agricultural	sector,	which	
had	been	in	decline	since	1991.	Currently,	agriculture	nominally	
accounts	for	the	employment	of	over	50%	of	those	active	in	the	la-
bour	market,	yet	generates	only	slightly	over	8%	of	GDP52.	Georgia	
50	 Cf.	Georgian	National	Study,	26	April	–	4	May	2011.
51	 2009	figures.	Source:	‘Implementation	of	the	European	Neighbourhood	Pol-
icy	 in	2009:	Progress	Report	Georgia’,	http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/
progress2010/sec10_518_en.pdf	
52	 Cf.	http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=428&lang=eng	
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imports	an	estimated	80–90%	of	 its	 food.	To	compare,	 in	Soviet	
times	agriculture	provided	25%	of	all	jobs	and	generated	32%	of	the	
republic’s	national	income53.
Another	problem	concerns	Georgia’s	dependence	on	international	
assistance.	After	the	‘Rose	Revolution’,	a	large	stream	of	loans	and	
grants	started	flowing	into	Georgia	from	international	aid	organ-
isations:	 the	 International	Monetary	Fund,	 the	World	Bank,	 the	
European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development,	etc.,	as	well	
as	the	United	States	and	the	European	Commission.	According	to	
World	Bank	estimates,	between	2004	and	2009	Georgia	received	
around	US$3.137	billion	of	ODA	(Official	Development	Assistance).	
Those	figures	certainly	do	not	include	all	categories	of	aid	(such	
as	military	aid),	and	exclude	a	major	part	of	 the	post-war	assis-
tance	package	worth	US$4.5	billion.	The	influx	of	foreign	aid	has	
contributed	considerably	to	Georgia’s	rapid	transformation,	but	at	
the	same	time	has	made	Tbilisi	deeply	dependent	on	a	permanent	
stream	 of	 external	 financing.	 Official	 figures	 demonstrate	 that	
in	2010	over	20%	of	budget	spending	was	covered	by	aid	funding	
–	grants,	 low	interest	 loans,	etc54.	According	to	unconfirmed	in-
formation,	Georgia	will	receive	another	large	payment	of	interna-
tional	aid	in	2012	as	‘recompense’	for	withdrawing	its	objections	
to	 Russia’s	 accession	 to	 the	WTO.	 Nevertheless,	 aid	 to	 Georgia	
will	probably	start	shrinking	in	the	coming	years,	posing	a	major	
challenge	because	of	Georgia’s	lack	of	economic	self-sufficiency.	
53	 Glenn	E.	Curtis,	ed.	Georgia: A Country Study.	Washington:	GPO	for	the	Li-
brary	 of	Congress,	 1994.	 http://countrystudies.us/georgia/43.htm	 (last	 ac-
cessed	20	January	2012).
54	 Cf.	Georgian	Economy	Overview,	April	2011.
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iv. futurE challEnGEs
1. Challenges for Georgia
Since	the	‘Rose	Revolution’,	Georgia	has	been	a	most	spectacular	
political	experiment,	which	has	inspired	enthusiasm	in	the	West	
for	years	and	has	been	admired	by	the	pro-Western	elements	of	
societies	in	the	other	CIS	countries.	
Yet	 despite	 the	 unquestionable	 achievements	 of	 President	
Saakashvili’s	team,	the	war	with	Russia	has	exposed	the	systemic	
weaknesses	and	limitations	of	the	Georgian	model,	as	well	as	the	
need	for	thorough	reforms	which	are	necessary	not	only	to	keep	
modernising	 the	 country,	 but	 also	 to	 maintain	 what	 has	 been	
achieved	so	 far.	Preserving	 the	 status quo,	 in	politics	and	 in	 the	
economy,	will	not	only	make	 it	 impossible	 to	eliminate	 the	sys-
tem’s	inherent	faults,	but	will	also	lead	to	a	rise	in	authoritarian	
practices	and	social	and	economic	problems.
Changes	are	also	necessary	in	view	of	the	international	situation,	
which	is	unfavourable	for	Tbilisi.	Because	of	the	serious	economic	
problems	 in	 the	 euro	 zone	 and	 the	United	 States,	 the	 changing	
balances	of	power	both	globally	and	within	Europe,	as	well	as	the	
dynamism,	depth	and	uncertain	outcomes	of	the	upheavals	in	the	
Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	 interest	 in	Georgia	will	probably	
wane	over	the	coming	years,	especially	if	the	reforms	anticipated	
by	the	West	do	not	materialise,	and	most	certainly	if	democratic	
standards	deteriorate.
In	 this	 situation,	 Georgia’s	 most	 important	 and	 most	 difficult	
challenge	is	to	truly	democratise	the	country,	which	will	require	
the	depoliticisation	of	the	state	apparatus,	the	development	of	free	
media,	an	independent	judiciary,	transparency	in	public	life	and	
the	rule	of	law;	ensuring	the	latter	may	well	prove	to	be	the	most	
difficult	 task.	The	 following	statement	by	President	Saakashvili	
is	noteworthy,	as	he	has	admitted,	“We’ve	become	a	modern	state	
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based	less	on	institutions	and	more	on	personalities;	now	we	should	
make	a	modern	society	based	on	rule	of	law	and	institutions”55.	If	
Georgia	is	to	continue	developing,	it	will	need	to	abandon	the	‘rev-
olutionary’	model	 of	 state	management	 based	 on	 improvisation	
and	arbitrary	decisions	by	a	narrow	circle.	It	will	have	to	build	up	
institutions	and	develop	procedures	that	can	operate	smoothly	ir-
respective	of	the	personalities	in	power,	and	beyond	the	eventual	
change	of	leadership	through	elections.	
Continued	 development	will	 also	 require	 a	 clear	 answer	 to	 the	
question	about	Georgia’s	identity	and	aspirations.	During	George	
W.	Bush’s	presidency,	Georgia	 clearly	 tended	 to	 follow	and	 imi-
tate	American	models	in	such	domains	as	the	organisation	of	the	
state,	 economy	 and	 culture.	After	 the	war	with	Russia	 and	 the	
change	 in	 US	 administration,	 when	 Tbilisi’s	 relations	with	 the	
United	states	cooled	off,	integration	with	the	EU	became	the	pre-
eminent	aim.	However,	seeking	rapprochement	with	the	EU	had	
long	been	more	of	an	expression	of	Tbilisi’s	general	aspirations	to	
be	part	of	 the	West	 in	 the	civilisational	and	cultural	 sense,	and	
less	of	a	real	commitment	to	adopt	the	specific	political	and	eco-
nomic	model.	Georgia’s	liberally-minded	political	elites	have	been	
objecting	to	the	prospect	of	having	to	implement	the	complicated	
EU	regulations.	The	following	statement	by	President	Saakashvili	
illustrates	this	point	well:	
It	is	difficult	to	work	with	the	Europeans.	This	is	a	huge	bureau-
cracy,	 and	 they	 do	not	 always	understand.	We	have	 eliminated	
90%	of	all	those	sanitary	and	fire	protection	inspectors,	the	phy-
tosanitary	services,	etc.	and	90%	of	all	 the	 licences	and	permits	
that	existed	before.	Our	system	is	very	simple.	But	when	you	talk	
with	the	Europeans,	they	always	ask	if	we	have	an	official	dealing	
with	the	given	issue,	like	in	Europe.	And	we	do	not	have	them,	to	
which	the	EU	people	immediately	say	that	we	will	have	to	create	
55	 Saakashvili	on	his	role	model,	Civil	Georgia,	31	December	2008,	http://www.
civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20221	(last	accessed	17	December	2011).
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such	offices.	And	then	we	reply	that	when	we	had	all	those	offi-
cials,	they	extorted	money	and	sucked	people’s	blood,	and	we	do	
not	miss	them56.
Yet	 despite	 Georgians’	 scepticism	 and	 long-held	 reluctance	 to	
adopt	EU	regulations,	Georgia	undertook	a	number	of	reforms	in	
2011	which	led	to	the	official	inauguration	in	January	2012	of	nego-
tiations	concerning	the	establishment	of	a	Deep	and	Comprehen-
sive	Free	Trade	Area	(DCFTA)	between	Georgia	and	the	EU.	The	
DCFTA	is	the	key	element	of	a	future	Association	Agreement	(AA).	
It	provides	for	the	abolition	of	tariffs	and	quotas	in	mutual	trade	
of	goods	and	services,	as	well	as	the	elimination	of	non-tariff	bar-
riers,	and	will	enable	Georgia	to	integrate	with	the	EU	market.	
Even	though	the	negotiations	will	probably	take	several	years	to	
be	concluded,	the	very	fact	that	they	have	been	opened	is	a	suc-
cess.	 The	 launch	 of	 negotiations	 had	 long	 hung	 in	 the	 balance,	
both	because	the	EU	had	set	very	strict	preconditions	(concerning	
sanitary	and	phytosanitary	standards,	competition	policy,	 tech-
nical	barriers	 to	 trade,	 intellectual	property	protection,	 and	 la-
bour	law57),	and	because	of	reluctance	on	Tbilisi’s	part.
Commenting	on	the	start	of	the	negotiations,	President	Saakashvili	
said	that	the	year	2011	had	been	a	turning	point	in	Tbilisi’s	relations	
with	Brussels,	and	that	it	had	brought	Georgia	closer	to	member-
ship	 in	 the	EU.	Allowing	 for	 the	President’s	 typical	 tendency	 to-
wards	hyperbole,	it	seems	that	Georgia’s	attitude	towards	the	As-
sociation	Agreement	negotiations	 indeed	underwent	 real	 change	
during	2011,	and	the	country	is	now	more	committed	to	the	process	
and	more	willing	 to	 implement	 European	 regulations.	 However,	
56	 http://tkachenko.ua/video/vypuski/?media_id=383432338	(last	accessed	13	Octo-
ber	2011).
57	 Cf.	‘An	Appraisal	of	the	EU’s	Trade	Policy	towards	its	Eastern	Neighbours:	
The	 Case	 of	 Georgia’,	 Brussels	 2011	 http://www.ceps.eu/book/appraisal-
eu%E2%80%99s-trade-policy-towards-its-eastern-neighbours-case-geor-
gia	(last	accessed	13	October	2011).
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this	change	was	certainly	motivated	mainly	by	the	disappointment	
with	the	downgrade	of	US/Georgia	relations	after	2008.	
2. Challenges for the West
Georgia’s	 pro-Western	 transformation	 after	 the	 ‘Rose	 Revolu-
tion’	has	been	one	of	the	West’s	greatest	 international	successes	
of	the	last	decade.	The	road	from	a	failed	state	to	a	fully	functional	
state,	which	Georgia	traversed	in	just	a	few	years,	not	only	dem-
onstrates	 the	benefits	of	 the	Western	political	and	civilisational	
offer,	but	also,	more	importantly,	proves	that	Western	standards	
can	take	root	also	beyond	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	which	was	
historically	bound	more	closely	to	the	West.	
By	supporting	the	transformation	in	Georgia,	the	West	has	dem-
onstrated	its	ability	to	influence	political	realities	in	areas	where	
it	 has	 vital	 interests.	 Post-revolutionary	Georgia	 is	 in	many	 re-
spects	a	symbol	of	the	West’s	ambition,	determination	and	capa-
bility	in	the	international	arena.	
Should	the	Georgian	project	stagnate,	or	worse,	become	derailed	
as	a	result	of	rising	authoritarian	tendencies,	an	economic	break-
down	or	a	new	war,	this	would	be	a	painful	defeat	for	the	West,	
and	would	 expose	 its	 inability	 to	 influence	 developments	 in	 its	
close	 neighbourhood	 and	 to	 retain	 its	 ‘holdings’.	 This,	 in	 turn,	
could	undermine	the	achievements	of	many	years	of	Western	in-
volvement	not	only	in	Georgia,	but	throughout	the	CIS.
A	real	 ‘qualitative	breakthrough’	in	the	functioning	of	Georgian	
democracy,	which	would	come	with	free	and	fair,	pluralistic	par-
liamentary	 and	 presidential	 elections,	 and	 a	 possible	 change	 of	
government	by	electoral	means,	would	be	an	unquestionable	suc-
cess	 for	 the	West,	 since	 fair	 elections	 remain	a	 rare	and	excep-
tional	occurrence	in	the	former	Soviet	area.
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It	 therefore	 appears	 that,	 despite	 the	 immensity	 of	 other	 chal-
lenges	and	the	apparent	‘Georgia	fatigue’,	the	West	should	be	vi-
tally	interested	in	the	continuation	of	the	country’s	pro-Western	
transformation.	In	order	to	succeed,	however,	it	needs	to	present	
an	attractive	offer	to	Tbilisi	by	providing	political,	economic	and	
expert	support,	 in	order	to	demonstrate	that	Georgia’s	 future	 is	
linked	with	that	of	the	West,	while	at	the	same	time	strictly	abid-
ing	by	the	principle	of	conditionality,	under	which	any	assistance	
should	depend	on	the	genuine	progress	of	internal	reforms.
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